Hoyer's Vindication

Jed Hoyer took over as the Chicago Cubs' President of Baseball Operations after the 2020 season. For a couple of reasons, he was instantly in an unenviable position (other than the fact that he holds probably one of the top five most fun jobs in the world). First, he was being promoted to fill the void left by his former boss and mentor, wunderkind Theo Epstein, who was leaving the Cubs after nine successful seasons, including their first World Series championship in over a century. Second, and less easily recognizable, was the fact that the Cubs' roster heading into 2021 was no longer the young and talented superteam that had reached the National League Championship Series three years running (2015-17). And although the Cubs had crept into the 2020 (pandemic-expanded) playoffs, cracks were beginning to show. Highly paid free agents like Jason Heyward and Jon Lester were nearing the twilights of their careers. And more pressingly, the youthful core that had spearheaded those playoff runs (Kris Bryant, Anthony Rizzo, and Javier Baez, along with Kyle Schwarber, Willson Contreras, and Kyle Hendricks) was underperforming its previous reputation.

We can look at a few Numbers to back this up. The 2020 season, shortened by the pandemic to 60 regular-season games, played in front of dolefully empty ballparks, etc. was an uncomfortable environment for most of us. It was hardly what you'd call a Representative Sample Size. But it didn't help that, as they fast approached free agency and a potentially life-changing (and franchise-changing) payday, all three of Bryant, Baez, and Rizzo put up seasons among the worst of their career. All three were set to reach the free market after the 2021 season, and the public sentiment was strongly in favor of the Cubs extending some if not all of them, locking them down at market rate and cementing their place as franchise cornerstones. This wasn't all nostalgia, either: all three had been very productive players in recent years. But in 2020, all three took turns for the worse. Rizzo was a league average (103 wRC+) hitter, putting up 1.0 WAR (2.7 162-game pace). Baez had a catastrophic season at the plate (57 wRC+, 32% K-rate), with only his defense keeping his value above water (1.9). And Bryant, missing some time due to injury, could only muster a 77 wRC+ with 4 HR in 147 plate appearances, essentially replacement level (0.3). Hardly the franchise savior he had been proclaimed to be, coming off a 2015 Rookie of the Year and 2016 MVP award.

In short, tough decisions were coming down the pike. And although I'm sure this isn't how either man actually considered these decisions, it's not functionally incorrect to point out that, de facto, Epstein stuck around for all the (deserved) success and, when the bill to pay the piper came due, neatly stepped out of the way, allowing his second-in-command, Jed Hoyer, to clean up the aftermath. Because the Cubs franchise was at a crossroads, and this wasn't the first indication that change -- and a lot of it -- might be necessary. The Cubs had won 95 games in 2018 but exited the playoffs early, and only won 84 games in 2019, missing the postseason entirely.

If you don't know already, I'm sure you can see where this is headed. A midseason eleven-game losing streak mired the team's chances, and on July 30, 2021, with the Cubs at a dismal 50-55, 12.5 games out of the division and ten out of the wild card, Hoyer traded all three: Rizzo to the Yankees, Baez to the Mets, and Bryant to the Giants. "Was it emotionally difficult? Yes," Hoyer told reporters. "Do I think it was absolutely the right thing for the organization? I do."

The Cubs' ownership and front office were panned by fans for the moves. (Transcripts from the family Discord server include "nO NO NO NO" and "i’m going into depression now".) Hoyer was blamed for making the trades and the "poverty" front office for not ponying up the cash to secure them to extensions. Perhaps this wasn't unjustified: it's only right that the 'championship core' holds a special place in our hearts, and in a span of mere hours, Jed had scattered it to the winds. Working night shift at the time, I went to bed (at noon) before the deadline, knowing that when I woke up, all three would be on different teams, and when I woke, they were. Even knowing that trading them was the right move, it was a sombre moment. For those who believed otherwise, who were convinced that extending some or all three for years into the future was better (or even possible), it was worse.

It didn't help, of course, that these moves did cement the Cubs' fate as basement dwellers for at least the next few years. The lineup was suddenly full of names like Rafael Ortega, Matt Duffy, and (who could forget) Frank Schwindel. The Cubs finished 2021 71-91 (4th in the division) and in 2022 went 74-88 (3rd). Going into 2023 and 2024, the winds began to change. Reasonably high-profile (medium-profile, at very least) free-agent additions such as Jameson Taillon, Dansby Swanson, and Seiya Suzuki joined the club and played well, pointing the Cubs in the right direction. But both seasons ended with identical 83-79 records, close to (but out of) the postseason. And that (perceived) lack of success has Cubs fans' evaluations of Jed's job performance very much still up in the air. The Chicago Sun-Times wrote that if the 2025 season continued in this vein, the Cubs should move on from Hoyer. Fan sites have been saying similar things for years.

Well, I'm here to tell you that they're wrong. Jed Hoyer is not bad at his job. In fact, he's quite good at it. Here are a few reasons that's the case:

1. We're not going to blame him for the Cubs' unwillingness to spend at the pinnacle of the free-agent market. Hoyer can only spend the money Ricketts lets him, and it's Ricketts' money. It is, perhaps, a mark of prudence (conservatism, even) to not tie seven hundred million dollars of guaranteed payroll into acquiring one player, even if that player is a future-HOF talent such as Juan Soto (as I discussed three years ago!) or Shohei Ohtani. And perhaps that prudence is characteristic of Hoyer's tenure as team president. But only one team can be the one to spend at that monumental level, and it's been clear for a decade that the Cubs aren't going to be it.

2. The free-agent decisions that Hoyer has made have been very good. First of all, the four key players he allowed to walk (Bryant, Rizzo, Baez, and Willson Contreras) have ranged from underwhelming to disastrous for their new clubs. Bryant, guaranteed $182M by the Colorado Rockies, has been plagued by injuries and ineffective (-1.9 total WAR in parts of four seasons). Rizzo was productive for a season and a half before falling sharply off a cliff (likely due to concussion complications) and now remains a free agent, only four years after turning down a five-year, $70M extension. After receiving $140M from Detroit, Baez' plate discipline issues only worsened, and he has yet to post even an average offensive season in a Tigers uniform. And while Contreras is still a productive hitter, his catching ability (which made him such a valuable asset to a franchise) had deteriorated to the point at which the Cardinals publicly removed him from the position, and he is now restricted to first base, at best. In other words, although Hoyer faced fan backlash at the time for letting these players go, hindsight has shown that in each case, he made the right decision. We are not watching Bryant and Baez rake for rival teams, longing for the days when they were Cubs. In fact, it's quite the opposite.

3. Let's consider the 2022 offseason. The Cubs needed a shortstop, and four premier shortstops were all hitting free agency at the same time: Trea Turner, Carlos Correa, Xander Bogaerts, and Dansby Swanson; it wasn't really a question of 'if' rather than 'which one'. Turner, regarded as the best of the four by many, signed with the Phillies for $300M. Bogaerts went to spend-happy San Diego for $280M. Correa, after ankle injury concerns surfaced, settled for $200M from the Twins (the Giants had offered a massive $350M deal, but backed out over the ankle concerns). And the Cubs, again prioritizing 'best value' over 'best player', landed Dansby Swanson for only $177M.

   Except for the fact that to this date, Swanson has been the best player of the four, by playing some of the best defense in the sport along with a slightly-better-than-average bat. Here we see 'best value' in its best possible outcome: targeting talented, high-floor players and getting high-percentile outcomes. Correa has underperformed and struggled to stay healthy. Bogaerts no longer plays shortstop. And while Turner has been good, he hasn't been $130M-better good. The Cubs spent the least amount of money (lowest total as well as lowest AAV) and got arguably the best player.

4. The 2023 and 2024 Cubs were better teams than their 83-79 (.512) finishes. In 2024, the Cubs' Pythagorean (expected based on runs scored and runs allowed) W-L record was 88-74, five games better than their actual W-L and what would have been one game out of the postseason. In 2023, their pythW-L was even better: 90-72, seven games better than their actual, which would have secured a Wild Card berth by six full games. There are several reasons why teams win more or less games than their expected results, but it's usually some correlation with poor performance in one-run or close games, so blame bullpen management or any managerial decisions, unfavorable umpire calls, and just plain luck. Baseball is a hard game, and a game of inches. And once the front office has built the team and sent it out for the season, there's really only so much they can do. In short: with better luck, the 23-24 Cubs could both have quite feasibly reached the postseason, and it's unfair to blame the front office for that underperformance.

5. The Cubs' young players and developmental system, ranked among the top five by most outlets last year, is finally beginning to bear fruit. Cade Horton, Ben Brown, and Matt Shaw have reached the major leagues and are beginning to make their mark. Cam Smith was the key piece in the trade that brought the Cubs Kyle Tucker. And Pete Crow-Armstrong, the 19-year-old the Cubs got in return from Javier Baez, is now 23 and playing like a superstar.

   
   

It's time to conclude. I've gone on long enough. But in truth, "Hoyer's Vindication" won't be because I sat here and told you so. At some point, you have to see real results. This 2025 Cubs team is the best Hoyer has constructed yet. At the time of writing, the Cubs are 32-21 (a 98-win pace), first in the NL Central, with the best run differential in the league. (Perhaps ironically, they are still two wins below their pythW-L). It's shaping up to be an exciting summer in Chicago, one that should silence the critics for good.